Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents (...) a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same. (shrink)

The understanding of science by members of the public has been of increasing concern to social scientists. This article argues that such understanding, or the ostensible lack of it, is structured by discourses that address science both as an abstract entity or principle and as an activity directed at specific phenomena or problems. Drawing upon a wide range of interviews about various sources of ionizing radiation, it is suggested that understanding is tied to questions of social identity that (...) encompass relations of differentiation from and identification with science and the institutions in which it is embedded. (shrink)

While the demands for greater engagement in science in general and regulatory science in particular have been steadily increasing, we still face limited understanding of the empirical resonance of these demands. Against this context, this paper presents findings from a recent study of a potential participatory opening of the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment, a prominent regulatory scientific organization in the field of risk governance. Drawing upon quantitative surveys of the public and selected professional experts as (...) well as in-depth qualitative expert interviews, we identify a general support for greater engagement in science-based risk assessment. However, we also find significant contestation concerning its potential enactment and its normative and strategic merit. Underlying these contestations, we identify the persistence of a normal view of science and decisionist understanding of risk assessment, which create conflicting legitimacy demands for BfR and other regulatory scientific organizations. Together with concerns about imbalances in the power to participate, especially in highly specialized engagement processes, these pose significant challenges for the institutionalization of more participatory practices. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate how inference to the best explanation (IBE) works in engineering science, focussing on the context of malfunction explanation. While IBE has gotten a lot of attention in the philosophy of science literature, few, if any, philosophical work has focussed on IBE in engineering science practice. We first show that IBE in engineering science has a similar structure as IBE in other scientific domains in the sense that in both settings IBE hinges (...) on the weighing of explanatory virtues. We then proceed to show that, due to the intimate connection between explanation and redesign in engineering science, there is a further engineering domain-specific virtue in terms of which engineering malfunction explanations are evaluated, viz. the virtue of redesign utility. This virtue entails that the explanatory information offered by a malfunction explanation should be instrumental in predicting counterfactual dependencies in redesigned systems. We illustrate and elaborate these points in terms of a number of engineering examples, focussing in particular on the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447. Our extension of analyses of IBE and explanation to engineering science practice offers new insights by identifying a new explanatory virtue in malfunction explanation: redesign utility. (shrink)

First published in 1983, this book examines the problems of concept formation in the social sciences, and in particular sociology, from the standpoint of a realistic philosophy of science. Beginning with a discussion of positivistic, hermeneutic, rationalist and realistic philosophies of science, Dr Outhwaite argues that realism is best able to furnish rational criteria for the choice and specification of social scientific concepts. A realistic philosophy of science therefore acts as his reference point for the dialectical (...) presentation of alternative accounts. (shrink)

This commentary gives a personal perspective on modeling and modeling developments in cognitive science, starting in the 1950s, but focusing on the author’s personal views of modeling since training in the late 1960s, and particularly focusing on advances since the official founding of the Cognitive Science Society. The range and variety of modeling approaches in use today are remarkable, and for many, bewildering. Yet to come to anything approaching adequate insights into the infinitely complex fields of mind, brain, (...) and intelligent systems, an extremely wide array of modeling approaches is vital and necessary. (shrink)

In European science and technology policy, various styles have been developed and institutionalised to govern the ethical challenges of science and technology innovations. In this paper, we give an account of the most dominant styles of the past 30 years, particularly in Europe, seeking to show their specific merits and problems. We focus on three styles of governance: a technocratic style, an applied ethics style, and a public participation style. We discuss their merits and deficits, and use this (...) analysis to assess the potential of the recently established governance approach of ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ (RRI). Based on this analysis, we reflect on the current shaping of RRI in terms of ‘doing governance’. (shrink)

The replication or reproducibility crisis in psychological science has renewed attention to philosophical aspects of its methodology. I provide herein a new, functional account of the role of replication in a scientific discipline: to undercut the underdetermination of scientific hypotheses from data, typically by hypotheses that connect data with phenomena. These include hypotheses that concern sampling error, experimental control, and operationalization. How a scientific hypothesis could be underdetermined in one of these ways depends on a scientific discipline’s epistemic goals, (...) theoretical development, material constraints, institutional context, and their interconnections. I illustrate how these apply to the case of psychological science. I then contrast this “bottom-up” account with “top-down” accounts, which assume that the role of replication in a particular science, such as psychology, must follow from a uniform role that it plays in science generally. Aside from avoiding unaddressed problems with top-down accounts, my bottom-up account also better explains the variability of importance of replication of various types across different scientific disciplines. (shrink)

Hegel begins the third main part of the Science of Logic, the “logic of the concept,” with the dialectic of universality. This dialectic, however, proves to be insufficient for the exposition of the fundamental structure of being-as-concept, because it is dominated by the perspective of self-identity. For this reason speculative logic develops a dialectic of particularity whose domain is dominated by the perspective of difference. While the dialectic of universality made explicit the meaning of the proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is universal, (...) the dialectic of particularity aspires to make explicit the meaning of the conflicting proposition-of-reason being-as-concept is particular. The present paper attempts a detailed reconstruction of this dialectic and thereby a disclosure of the meaning of the onto-logical claim that being-as-concept is particular. It is first shown how Hegel’s account of the particular relates to the expression of a totality of particulars. Next it is argued that the speculative notion of the particular is extremely complex and that this complexity can be decoded by means of four dimensions. Third, it is explained how abstraction comes to be regarded by Hegel as the essence of the particular. I end the paper by discussing how the collapse of the dialectic of particularity gives rise to the category of the individual and its peculiar dialectic. (shrink)

Semantic Network Analysis in Social Sciences introduces the fundamentals of semantic network analysis and its applications in the social sciences. Readers learn how to easily transform any given text into a visual network of words co-occurring together, a process that allows mapping the main themes appearing in the text and revealing its main narratives and biases. Semantic network analysis is particularly useful today with the increasing volumes of text-based information available. It is one of the developing, cutting-edge methods to organize, (...) identify patterns and structures, and understand the meanings of our information society. The first chapters in this book offer step-by-step guidelines for conducting semantic network analysis, including choosing and preparing the text, selecting desired words, constructing the networks, and interpreting their meanings. Free software tools and code are also presented. The rest of the book displays state-of-the-art studies from around the world that apply this method to explore news, political speeches, social media content, and even to organize interview transcripts and literature reviews. Aimed at scholars with no previous knowledge in the field, this book can be used as a main or a supplementary textbook for general courses on research methods or network analysis courses, as well as a starting point to conduct your own content analysis of large texts. (shrink)

One of the most common contemporary approaches for developing an ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) involves elaborating guiding principles. This essay explores the limitations of this approach, using the history of bioethics as a comparative case. The examples of bioethics and recent AI ethics suggest that principles are difficult to implement in everyday practice, fail to direct individual action, and can frequently result in a pure proceduralism. The essay encourages an additional attention to virtue, which forms the dispositions of actors, (...) directs them to valued ends, and encourages right action in particular situation to complement principles. Practices and professions like medicine or warfighting that already have rich traditions of reflection on virtue ethics will be especially fruitful fields for developing an AI ethics of virtue. (shrink)

Methodologists in political science have advocated for causal process tracing as a way of providing evidence for causal mechanisms. Recent analyses of the method have sought to provide more rigorous accounts of how it provides such evidence. These accounts have focused on the role of process tracing for causal inference and specifically on the way it can be used with case studies for testing hypotheses. While the analyses do provide an account of such testing, they pay little attention to (...) the narrative elements of case studies. I argue that the role of narrative in case studies is not merely incidental. Narrative does cognitive work by both facilitating the consideration of alternative hypotheses and clarifying the relationship between evidence and explanation. I consider the use of process tracing in a particular case (the Fashoda Incident) in order to illustrate the role of narrative. I argue that process tracing contributes to knowledge production in ways that the current focus on inference tends to obscure. (shrink)

Are there laws in evolutionary biology? Stephen J. Gould has argued that there are factors unique to biological theorizing which prevent the formulation of laws in biology, in contradistinction to the case in physics and chemistry. Gould offers the problem of complexity as just such a fundamental barrier to biological laws in general, and to Dollos Law in particular. But I argue that Gould fails to demonstrate: (1) that Dollos Law is not law-like, (2) that the alleged failure of (...) Dollos Law demonstrates why there cannot be laws in biological science, and (3) that complexity is a fundamental barrier to nomologicality. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic posed many ethical and practical challenges for academic research. Some of these have been documented, particularly in relation to health research, but less attention has been paid to the dilemmas encountered by educational and social science research. Given that pandemics are predicted to be more frequent, it is vital to understand how to continue crucial research in schools and other learning communities. This article therefore focuses specifically on research ethics in educational and social science during (...) the pandemic of 2020–2022. The research involved interviews and workshops with University College London (UCL) academics, professional staff and graduate students and encompassed those involved in reviewing ethics applications, researchers dealing with ethics in projects that continued despite disruptions caused by COVID-19, and successful research projects specifically designed to study the effects of COVID-19 in various contexts. The article discusses some of the crucial knowledge and practical experiences that were accumulated. The operational and epistemological lessons learned from this particular institution may have wider relevance to research ethics processes in higher education environments where academics and students are grappling with post-COVID-19 ethical dilemmas and inform broader debates about how research institutions can build institutional knowledge to improve practices of ethics review at the times of health emergencies in future. Our evidence points to the significance of inter- and multidisciplinary, collaborative approaches that flatten institutional hierarchies and to the crucial role played by professional staff. In addition, we argue that ethics review processes must be underpinned by critical debates about wider issues of unequal power relationships between research partners, the nature of knowledge production, ownership and utilisation. To enhance equity and epistemic justice in research practices, ethics education should be an ongoing integral part of research ethics within research institutions. (shrink)

Bewildering features of modern physics, such as relativistic space-time structure and the peculiarities of so-called quantum statistics, challenge traditional ways of conceiving of objects in space and time. Interpreting Bodies brings together essays by leading philosophers and scientists to provide a unique overview of the implications of such physical theories for questions about the nature of objects. The collection combines classic articles by Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, Hans Reichenbach, and Erwin Schrodinger with recent contributions, including several papers that have never (...) before been published. -/- The book focuses on the microphysical objects that are at the heart of quantum physics and addresses issues central to both the "foundational" and the philosophical debates about objects. Contributors explore three subjects in particular: how to identify a physical object as an individual, the notion of invariance with respect to determining what objects are or could be, and how to relate objective and measurable properties to a physical entity. The papers cover traditional philosophical topics, common-sense questions, and technical matters in a consistently clear and rigorous fashion, illuminating some of the most perplexing problems in modern physics and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The bias–variance tradeoff is a theoretical concept that suggests machine learning algorithms are susceptible to two kinds of error, with some algorithms tending to suffer from one more than the other. In this letter, we claim that the bias–variance tradeoff is a general concept that can be applied to human cognition as well, and we discuss implications for research in cognitive science. In particular, we show how various strands of research in cognitive science can be interpreted in (...) light of the bias–variance tradeoff, giving insight into individual differences in learning, the nature of cognitive processes, and debates in cognitive science research. (shrink)

Causal inference is perhaps the most important form of reasoning in the sciences. A panoply of disciplines, ranging from epidemiology to biology, from econometrics to physics, make use of probability and statistics to infer causal relationships. The social and health sciences analyse population-level data using statistical methods to infer average causal relations. In diagnosis of disease, probabilistic statements are based on population-level causal knowledge combined with knowledge of a particular person’s symptoms. For the physical sciences, the Salmon-Dowe account develops (...) an analysis of causation based on the notion of process and interaction. In artificial intelligence, the development of graphical methods has leant impetus to a probabilistic analysis of causality. The biological sciences use probabilistic methods to look for evolutionary causes of the state of a current species and to look for genetic causal factors. This variegated situation raises at least two fundamental philosophical issues: about the relation between causality and probability, and about the interpretation of probability in causal analysis. In this book we bring philosophers and scientists together to discuss the relation between causality and probability, and the applications of these concepts within the sciences. (shrink)

The computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach is that there is a natural domain of (...) human functioning that can be addressed exclusively in terms of a formal symbolic or algorithmic vocabulary or level of analysis. Much of the paper elaborates various conditions that need to be met if a literal view of mental activity as computation is to serve as the basis for explanatory theories. The coherence of such a view depends on there being a principled distinction between functions whose explanation requires that we posit internal representations and those that we can appropriately describe as merely instantiating causal physical or biological laws. In this paper the distinction is empirically grounded in a methodological criterion called the " cognitive impenetrability condition." Functions are said to be cognitively impenetrable if they cannot be influenced by such purely cognitive factors as goals, beliefs, inferences, tacit knowledge, and so on. Such a criterion makes it possible to empirically separate the fixed capacities of mind from the particular representations and algorithms used on specific occasions. In order for computational theories to avoid being ad hoc, they must deal effectively with the "degrees of freedom" problem by constraining the extent to which they can be arbitrarily adjusted post hoc to fit some particular set of observations. This in turn requires that the fixed architectural function and the algorithms be independently validated. It is argued that the architectural assumptions implicit in many contemporary models run afoul of the cognitive impenetrability condition, since the required fixed functions are demonstrably sensitive to tacit knowledge and goals. The paper concludes with some tactical suggestions for the development of computational cognitive theories. (shrink)

Following an initial discussion of the general nature of interpretation in contemporary psychology, and social and natural science, relevant views of Charles Taylor and Thomas Kuhn are considered in some detail. Although both Taylor and Kuhn agree that interpretation in the social or human sciences differs in some ways from interpretation in the natural sciences, they disagree about the nature and origins of such difference. Our own analysis follows, in which we consider differences in interpretation between the natural and (...) social sciences in terms of Ian Hacking's use of Elizabeth Anscombe's conceptualization of actions as intentional acts under particular descriptions. We conclude that both Taylor and Kuhn are correct to point to differences in interpretation between the natural and social sciences. We also argue that in psychology, such interpretive differences, contra Kuhn and pro Taylor, are qualitative rather than quantitative. They arise from the nature of persons as self-interpretive, reactive beings who act under socioculturally sanctioned, linguistic descriptions. The actions of psychological persons may display qualitative differences over time and across contexts as these descriptions, including social scientific and psychological findings and interpretations, change. In contrast, even when descriptions in natural science change, such changes do not spawn changes in the self-interpretations and intentional actions of the focal phenomena of natural science. We also make the point that much current confusion surrounding interpretation in science arises from the unwarranted tendency of some commentators to treat interpretation as subjective, in ways that ignore the objective grounding of interpretation within regulated social practices, including scientific practices sanctioned by scientific communities. (shrink)

In the past few years, scholars have been questioning whether the current approach in data ethics based on the higher level case studies and general principles is effective. In particular, some have been complaining that such an approach to ethics is difficult to be applied and to be taught in the context of data science. In response to these concerns, there have been discussions about how ethics should be “embedded” in the practice of data science, in the (...) sense of showing how ethical issues emerge in small technical choices made by data scientists in their day-to-day activities, and how such an approach can be used to teach data ethics. However, a precise description of how such proposals have to be theoretically conceived and could be operationalized has been lacking. In this article, we propose a full-fledged characterization of ‘embedding’ ethics, and how this can be applied especially to the problem of teaching data science ethics. Using the emerging model of ‘microethics’, we propose a way of teaching daily responsibility in digital activities that is connected to the higher level ethical challenges discussed in digital/data ethics. We ground this microethical approach into a virtue theory framework, by stressing that the goal of a microethics is to foster the cultivation of moral virtues. After delineating this approach of embedding ethics in theoretical detail, this article discusses a concrete example of how such a ‘micro-virtue ethics’ approach could be practically taught to data science students. (shrink)

In the past few hundred years, science has exerted an enormous influence on the way the world appears to human observers. Despite phenomenal accomplishments of science, science nowadays faces numerous challenges that threaten its continued success. As scientific inventions become embedded within human societies, the challenges are further multiplied. In this critical review, some of the critical challenges for the field of modern chemistry are discussed, including: (a) interlinking theoretical knowledge and experimental approaches; (b) implementing the principles (...) of sustainability at the roots of the chemical design; (c) defining science from a philosophical perspective that acknowledges both pragmatic and realistic aspects thereof; (d) instigating interdisciplinary research; (e) learning to recognize and appreciate the aesthetic aspects of scientific knowledge and methodology, and promote truly inspiring education in chemistry. In the conclusion, I recapitulate that the evolution of human knowledge inherently depends upon our ability to adopt creative problem-solving attitudes, and that challenges will always be present within the scope of scientific interests. (shrink)

The papers presented here derive from the 4th International Confe:--ence on History and Philosophy of Science held in Blacksburg, Virginia, U. S. A., November 2-6, 1982. The Conference was sponsored by the I nternational Union of History and Philosophy of Science and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech). Particular thanks go to L. Jonathan Cohen, Secretary of the Union, as well as to Dean Henry Bauer of the College of Arts & Sciences, Wilfred Jewkes and (...) the Center for Programs in the Humanities, Arthur Donovan and the Center for the Study of Science in Society and the Department of Philoso­ phy and Religion at Virginia Tech. Not only did they come through with the necessat"y funds, but they were all always ready with a helping hand when things got confusing. Two additional groups of individuals require a special note of thanks. First, considerable appreciation is due the mem­ bers of the Joint Commission of the I nternational Union of History and Philosophy of Science: Maurice Crosland, Risto Hilpinen and Vladimir Kirsanov. They were more than gen­ erous in thei r advice and co-operation. The Local Organizing Committee (Kenneth Alpern, Roger Ariew, Arthur Donovan, Larry Laudan, Ann La Berge, Duncan Porter, Eleonore Stump and Dennis Welch) not only demon­ strated efficiency and insured a pleasant stay for' all participants, but also went out of their way on numerous occasions to make everyone feel at home. (shrink)

Understanding the biological basis of consciousness is one of the central challenges for modern science. Is a mature scientific explanation really possible, and if so, how should consciousness science be organized so as to achieve this? This thesis is a collection of four papers which approach these questions via an account of the natural categories or ‘kinds’, drawn from philosophy of science, to which paradigmatic mental phenomena like consciousness belong. The central claims defended in the thesis are (...) twofold. Firstly, that to facilitate a mature science of consciousness it is crucial to explicitly introduce a new organizing concept of consciousness modelled on the kinds of concepts which underpin previous successful explanations of other natural phenomena – that of a natural kind concept of consciousness. This draws on the general observation that some concepts are better suited to scientific theorizing about the world than others, and thus that progress in scientific and philosophical domains can be (and indeed, has often been) made by working to refine our existing conceptual schemes to reflect this. Secondly, that a mature science of consciousness will be one which recognizes the reality and explanatory importance of a particular category of mental phenomena called ‘global states of consciousness’ which includes dreaming and wakefulness. Examination of this latter claim leads to a third idea explored and motivated in the thesis which brings consciousness science into closer connection with psychiatry. This is the hypothesis that Major Depressive Disorder involves a change to a subject’s global state of consciousness, marking a change from a state of ordinary wakeful consciousness to an altered ‘depressive state’ of consciousness akin to a dream or psychedelic state. (shrink)

We discuss the potential of applying category theory to the study of consciousness. We first review a recent proposal from the neurosciences of consciousness to illustrate the “correlational project”, using the integrated information theory of consciousness as an example. We then discuss some technical preliminaries related to categories and in particular to the notion of a functor, which carries the bulk of conceptual weight in many current discussions. We then look at possible payoffs of this project—getting to grips with (...) the hard problem, theory integration, and exploiting explanatory dualities—and discuss possible avenues for further research, stressing the need to better develop the categorical representation of consciousness, in particular its phenomenological structure. A better understanding of consciousness cannot be achieved by merely studying the physical brain. By contrast, the categorical treatment even suggests application beyond the domain of neuroscience, for example in computer science and artificial intelligence research, while also emphasizing the primacy of (phenomenal) experience. (shrink)

A flurry of discussions about plagiarism and predatory publications in recent times has brought the issue of scientific misconduct in India to the fore. The debate has framed scientific misconduct in India as a recent phenomenon. This article questions that framing, which rests on the current tendency to define and police scientific misconduct as a matter of individual behavior. Without ignoring the role of individuals, this article contextualizes their actions by calling attention to the conduct of the institutions, as well (...) as social and political structures that are historically responsible for governing the practice of science in India since the colonial period. Scientific (mis)conduct, in other words, is here examined as a historical phenomenon borne of the interaction between individuals’ aspirations and the systems that impose, measure, and reward scientific output in particular ways. Importantly, historicizing scientific misconduct in this way also underscores scientist-driven initiatives and regulatory interventions that have placed India at the leading edge of reform. With the formal establishment of the Society for Scientific Values in 1986, Indian scientists became the first national community worldwide to monitor research integrity in an institutionally organized way. (shrink)

The paper aims at identifying, explaining and illustrating the affordances of “creative nonfiction” as a style of writing social science. The first part introduces creative nonfiction as a method of writing which brings together empirical material and fiction. In the second part, based on illustrations from my ethnographic research of European “crisis reporters,” written in the form of a novel about a fictional journalist, but also based on a review of existing social science research that employs a creative (...) method of writing, I identify several main affordances of creative nonfiction in social-scientific research. In particular, I argue that creative nonfiction allows scientists to illustrate their findings, to express them in an allegorical way, to organize data into a narrative, to let their pieces of research act in the social world, and to permeate research accounts with self-reflexive moments. I also discuss some apparent negative affordances: challenges that creative nonfiction poses to readers and to the institutionalized academic discourse. Finally, I suggest that writing about sociological problems in the style of creative nonfiction can help to produce more engaging and engaged texts, and I discuss the ethical implications of the approach. (shrink)

We discuss prior publication and redundancy in contemporary science in the context of changing perceptions of originality in the communication of research results. These perceptions have been changing in the publication realm, particularly in the last 15 years. Presenting a brief overview of the literature, we address some of the conflicts that are likely to arise between authors and editors. We illustrate our approach with conference presentations that are later published as journal articles and focus on a recent retraction (...) of an article that had been previously published as a conference proceedings. Although we do not make definitive pronouncements on the matter—as many concepts are evolving—we do argue that conference papers that contain sufficient details for others to attempt a replication and are indexed in scientific databases such as PubMed, challenge some currently held assumptions of prior publication and originality in the sciences. Our view is that these important issues are in need of further clarification and harmonization within the science publishing community. This need is more evident when we consider current notions of research integrity when it comes to communication to peers. Revisiting long-standing views about what constitutes prior publication and developing a clearer set of guidelines for authors and editors to follow should reduce conflicts in the research environment, which already exerts considerable pressure, especially on newcomers in academia. However, while clearer guidelines are timely, developing them is only part of the challenge. The present times seem to call for deeper changes in the research and publication systems. (shrink)

The science/non-science distinction has become increasingly blurred. This paper investigates whether recent cases of fraud in science can shed light on the distinction. First, it investigates whether there is an absolute distinction between science and non-science with respect to fraud, and in particular with regards to manipulation and fabrication of data. Finding that it is very hard to make such a distinction leads to the second step: scrutinizing whether there is a normative distinction between (...) science and non-science. This is done by investigating one of the recent internationally famous frauds in science, the Sudbø case. This case demonstrates that moral norms are not only needed to regulate science because of its special characteristics, such as its potential for harm, but moral norms give science its special characteristics. Hence, moral norms are crucial in differentiating science from non-science. Although this does not mean that ethics can save the life of science, it can play a significant role in its resuscitation. (shrink)

In this chapter, we propose a non-traditional RCR training in data science that is grounded in a virtue theory framework. First, we delineate the approach in more theoretical detail by discussing how the goal of RCR training is to foster the cultivation of certain moral abilities. We specify the nature of these ‘abilities’: while the ideal is the cultivation of virtues, the limited space allowed by RCR modules can only facilitate the cultivation of superficial abilities or proto-virtues, which help (...) students to familiarize themselves with moral and political issues in the data science environment. Third, we operationalize our approach by stressing that (proto-)virtue acquisition (like skill acquisition) occurs through the technical and social tasks of daily data science activities, where these repetitive tasks provide the opportunities to develop (proto-)virtue capacity and to support the development of ethically robust data systems. Finally, we discuss a concrete example of implementing this approach. In particular, we describe how this method is applied to teach data ethics to students participating in the CODATA-RDA Data Science Summer Schools. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the normative analysis—in the sense of the classic decision-theoretic formulation—of decision problems that arise in connection with forensic expert reporting. We distinguish this analytical account from other common types of decision analyses, such as descriptive approaches. While decision theory is, since several decades, an extensively discussed topic in legal literature, its use in forensic science is more recent, and with an emphasis on goals such as the analysis of the logical structure of forensic expert conclusions (...) regarding, for example, propositions of common source of evidential and known materials. Typical examples are so-called identification decisions, especially categorical conclusions according to which fingermarks come from a particular a person of interest. We will present and compare ways of stating forensic identification decisions in decision-theoretic terms and explain their underlying rationale. In particular, we will emphasize the importance of viewing this analysis as normative in the sense of providing a reflective rather than a prescriptive reference point against which people in charge of forensic identification decisions may compare their otherwise intuitive and informal reasoning, before acting. Normative decision analysis in forensic science thus provides a vector through which current practice can be articulated, scrutinized and rethought. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider the relation of history of philosophy to the history of science. I argue that though these two disciplines are naturally linked, they also have special commitments that distinguish each from the other. I begin with the history of the history of science, a discipline that was once allied with philosophy of science but that has increasingly evolved toward social history. Then I consider the debate over whether the history of philosophy is essential (...) for, or rather largely irrelevant to, contemporary “analytic” philosophy. My conclusion is that the relation of history of philosophy to philosophy is best conceived in terms of the relation of history of science to history. Finally, I consider a particular case study of the relation of history of science to history of philosophy that concerns contextualist scholarship on early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

Deception of subjects is used frequently in the social sciences. Examples are provided. The ethics of experimental deception are discussed, in particular various maneuvers to solve the problem. The results have implications for the use of deception in the biomedical sciences.

This paper describes patterns of participation and attainment in A‐level physics, chemistry and biology from 1961 to 2009. The A level has long been seen as an important gateway qualification for higher level study, particularly in the sciences. This long‐term overview examines how recruitment to these three subjects has changed in the context of numerous policies and initiatives that seek to retain more young people in the sciences. The results show that recruitment to the pure sciences has stagnated, general trends (...) have hardly varied and the track record of government policy in influencing change is not strong. There is no evidence for increasing achievement gaps between the sexes at A level and even national policy requiring that all young people study science up to the age of 16 appears to have had little impact on recruitment at this level. (shrink)

In evaluating science, philosophers tends to focus on general laws and on their truth. I urge a shift in focus to the reliability of the panoply of outputs science produces and in tandem, from the general to the particular. Here I give five arguments to support this, including many, many scientific outputs, which must be supposed reliable if we are to warrant our general principles, aren’t truth-apt; and reliability invites the crucial question, ‘Reliable for what?’ Getting clear (...) the particular purpose is essential for effective action and just evaluation. (shrink)

This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those (...) assumptions arguably include some necessitist principles. -/- Too often, philosophers have discussed ‘metaphysical’ modality — possibility, contingency, necessity — in isolation. Yet metaphysical modality is just a special case of a broad range of modalities, which we may call ‘objective’ by contrast with epistemic and doxastic modalities, and indeed deontic and teleological ones (compare the distinction between objective probabilities and epistemic or subjective probabilities). Thus metaphysical possibility, physical possibility and immediate practical possibility are all types of objective possibility. We should study the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality as part of a broader study of the metaphysics and epistemology of the objective modalities, on pain of radical misunderstanding. Since objective modalities are in general open to, and receive, natural scientific investigation, we should not treat the metaphysics and epistemology of metaphysical modality in isolation from the metaphysics and epistemology of the natural sciences. -/- In what follows, Section 1 gives a preliminary sketch of metaphysical modality and its place in the general category of objective modality. Section 2 reviews some familiar forms of scepticism about metaphysical modality in that light. Later sections explore a few of the many ways in which natural science deals with questions of objective modality, including questions of quantified modal logic. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for a naturalistic solution to some of the methodological controversies in regulatory science, on the basis of two case studies: toxicology and health claim regulation. We analyze the debates related to the scientific evidence that is considered necessary for regulatory decision making in each of those two fields, with a particular attention to the interactions between scientific and regulatory aspects. This analysis allows us to identify two general stances in the debate: a) one (...) that argues for more permissive standards of evidence and for methodological pluralism, and b) an opposing one that not only defends strict evidence requirements but also stipulates the use of one particular scientific methodologies for data generation. We argue that the real-world outcomes produced by alternative regulatory options are a vital piece of information that allows for the empirical assessment of these two stances. In particular, this information on outcomes makes it possible to analyze which standards of evidence and scientific methods generate the most useful knowledge as input for regulatory decision making. Our conclusion is that instead of an a priori selection of methodologies and standards, such decisions ought to be based on empirical evidence related to real-world outcomes. (shrink)

The nature of the human being in general and the existence and nature of the soul in particular has been discussed throughout the history of thought. As a knowing subject, man firstly tried to know himself. While making this questioning, he not only wondered about his phenomenal existence (body), but also about his spiritual identity, which he did not doubt was out there somewhere. This curiosity has created an ongoing scientific journey from anatomy to physiology, from science to (...) philosophy, from medicine to sociology, from biology to neurobiology, from psychology to neuropsychology, from chemistry to neurochemistry. In the end, various human conceptions have been developed in accordance with the scientific and philosophical background of each civilization. The ancient tradition of thought, which is the common accumulation of humanity, has largely included man in a dualist definition. Along with modern science, many devices have been developed to study human beings physically. Numerous data have been reached with the opportunities provided by technology, and these data have provided great usefulness in understanding what aspects a human being has in terms of physics and metaphysics. However, with the increase in our knowledge of the natural world and human, which is a part of it, the perspectives of the period were forced into paradigmatic changes. The philosophical movements that developed and changed in parallel with scientific knowledge, the decline of religion, especially in the Western world, regressed the dominant models in the interpretation of knowledge. Notions of human have inevitably taken their share from this great change. Is the subject behind the actions separate/independent from the body/brain and completely autonomous and rational? Or is it just the body/brain or its functionality, as modern neuroscience suggests? Does this coherent functionality arise entirely or in part from natural causation? Is there an essence or a distinctive feature that makes us human? If so, is this essence/property physical or is it a metaphysical substance? What answers did the early theologians give to these questions? What are the points of overlap between the hypotheses developed mainly on religious knowledge, partly on medical knowledge of the period via largely logical reasoning, and the definitions of human and soul revealed by contemporary experimental science? This line forms the main frame of the article. In summary, this study; It aims to identify the parallels and similarities of approach between the spiritual theories of the early theologians and current scientific data, which we see as two important phases of the ongoing ancient investigation. It is thought that the theories developed in this first period, when the transformation due to the acculturation process is not sufficiently determinative on thought, are more original and valuable. After giving brief information about the definitions of soul, mind, self and consciousness, which are among the basic concepts of the problem, the thoughts of early Mu‘tazilī and Ahl al-Sunnah thinkers on the subject are presented comparatively with current scientific data. We tried to make a healthy descriptive inference by making analytical and semantic arguments on the data obtained during the research. (shrink)

Qualitative research provides rigorous methods not only for investigating behavioral or social issues, but can also be used for exploring epistemic issues related to science and its practices. There is growing scholarly awareness that important aspects of science can be best understood through qualitative analyses and cannot be captured using more traditional textual sources such as publications or archival documents or via more quantitative or formalized methodologies such as citation analysis or bibliometrics. Reflecting on our own research on (...) the philosophy of scientific practices, particularly on the role of model organisms in biology, we discuss some of the challenges associated with the design and conduct of qualitative research in the philosophy of science. We then explore three issues in more detail: The extent to which qualitative methods support the identification of media and spaces for the study of epistemic questions in science; the investigation of social structures particularly relevant to scientific practices and reasoning; and the conceptual and interpretative significance of analytic choices in empirical research on science. In closing, we reflect on the value of qualitative research methods for understanding scientific practices as ways to identify novel research directions, refine and augment philosophically motivated research questions, investigate the rationales and procedures through which particular scientific choices become ingrained in research, and question the implications of such habits as norms for what counts as “best practice” in particular scientific fields, all of which are topics that deserve more attention from philosophers and other scholars interested in scientific practices. (shrink)

How to deal with non-epistemic values in science presents a pressing problem for science and society as well as for philosophers of science. In recent years, accounts of democratizing science have been proposed as a possible solution to this. By providing a case study on the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy comment: Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services comment: (IPBES), I argue that such accounts run into a problem when values are embedded in the general (...) scientific and societal setup to such an extent that they shape the terrain upon which such a democratization needs to take place. I introduce the notion of particularities as manifestations of values in science and state a problem of particularity, posed by the ways in which the interactive dimension of particularities interferes with democratic procedures for resolving value judgements in science. As a possible remedy, I propose enriching accounts of democratizing science by agonistic theories of democracy. (shrink)

This paper examines some sources of the concepts of existence, explanation, and force in ancient thought, and shows how those ideas have been altered in fundamental ways in modem physics. Some lessons for the philosophy of science, in particular implications for its methodology, are considered.

While the earlier work of Philip Kitcher, in particular The Advancement of Science (1993), continues to inform his more recent studies, such as Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), there are significant "changes of opinion" from those articulated in the 1990s. One may even speak of two different stages in the configuration of epistemological proposals. An analysis, from an empiricist standpoint, of the shifts between one and the other indicates further evolution towards realist positions but much more modest (...) ones than those previously endorsed. Kitcher qualifies former individualism with an ensuing defence of pluralism, vital to his effort to develop a social epistemology. The present centrality of the achievement of a well-ordered science , one that promotes the common good within the context of democracies, encapsulates recent variation in the work of Kitcher and may be considered one of the author's most defendable proposals, even including its classically empiricist resonance. (shrink)

Balancing speed and quality during crises pose challenges for ensuring the value and utility of data in social science research. The COVID-19 pandemic in particular underscores the need for high-quality data and rapid dissemination. Given the importance of behavioural measures and compliance with measures to contain the pandemic, social science research has played a key role in policymaking during this global crisis. This study addresses two key research questions: How FAIR ( findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable) are (...) social science data on the COVID-19 pandemic? Which study features are related to the level of FAIRness scores of datasets? We assess the FAIRness of n = 1131 articles, retrieved through a keyword search in the Web of Science database, employing both automated and manual coding methods. Our study inclusion criteria encompass empirical studies on the COVID-19 pandemic published between 2019 and 2023 with a social science focus and explicit reference to the underlying dataset(s). Our analysis of n = 45 datasets reveals substantial differences in FAIRness for different types of research on the COVID-19 pandemic. The overall FAIRness of data is acceptable, although particularly Reusability scores fall short, in both the manual and the automatic assessment. Further, articles explicitly linked to the Social Science concept in the OpenAlex database exhibit a higher mean overall FAIRness value. Based on these results, we derive recommendations for balancing ethical obligations and the potential tradeoff between speed and data (sharing) quality in social-scientific crisis research. (shrink)

Definition of the problem “Dual use” refers to the applicability of a research result or methods for purposes that concern the internal or external security of a society. This includes research that can be used for military, intelligence, terrorist, or criminal purposes. Dual use has been an increasingly aggravating problem for many areas of the life sciences and medicine for over a decade. The main cause for this is that many of their results are capable of demonstrating how humans, but (...) also (domestic) animals and plants, can be manipulated and attacked, and which tools are particularly suitable for this purpose. Arguments The digitalization in the life sciences has two distinguishable impacts on the dual-use problem: an intensifying and an expanding one. By enabling faster and more comprehensive research and development processes, digitalization exacerbates the existing dual-use problem because it increases the pace at which the results of this research can be utilized for security-related purposes. Moreover, the digitalization of the life sciences expands the dual-use problem, as some of the digital tools developed and used in the life sciences can themselves have military or security-relevant applications. Conclusion Therefore, a broad-based governance including wide participation of stakeholders in the research process and broader information on dual use in good scientific practice education across institutions, career stages, and disciplines is necessary. (shrink)

This article provides a brief review of Saybrook Review, Vol 6, No. 1, Spring 1986. Special issue: Extensions in Human Science Methodology guest edited by Donald E. Polkinghorne. This issue contains articles written by four of the faculty of the Saybrook Institute, all of which examine "the consequences of extending the criteria of science beyond the traditional objectivism-relativism dichotomy." Polkinghorne's lead article is a compelling and clear historical characterization of the place of human science in today's academic (...) world. The second is an article by Anthony Stigliano that proposes "an ontology for the human sciences" where research would be grounded in a language of description that is "incomplete, discontinuous, dialogal, and interlaced with different 'levels' of discourse". Jurgen Kremer's article reviews prevailing views of reason and truth, and makes a proposal "for the development of narratives of truths...that consciously include moral and aesthetic dimensions." The final article is by Marcia Salner and is a piece that explores the question of validity in human science research, paying particular attention to "the central role of linguistic communication as a major data source, and to the role of communal negotiation and juridical rules for dealing with conflicting interpretations." Together these articles make a positive advance toward the understanding of the context as well as consequences of an epistemological position that stresses contextual relativism and embraces methodological pluralism. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In current trends in cognitive sciences, the discussion on body crosses the classical divide between the body and the self in terms of nature and function. Embodiment theories have helped to bring in the importance of the role of subjective experiences to understand cognition, and place the process of knowing in a cultural and social context. This article is a critique of the growing trend in cognitive sciences, particularly in affective neurosciences, and approaches, to reduce the experiential self to a (...) nonentity. It is shown that though the apparent goal is to highlight the inner qualitative nature of experience, what is happening in the background is a role reversal. The outer body becomes the inner self. The inner self becomes the outer body. The nature and functions of the self are founded on the body by theorizing embodiment as an alternate to neural reductionism. This article argues that one of the negative consequences of embodiment theories is that age-old concepts of freewill, character and moral choices become flimsy and fleeting in the process of embodying cognition. (shrink)

The importance of epistemic values in science is universally recognized, whereas the role of non-epistemic values is sometimes considered disputable. It has often been argued that non-epistemic values are more relevant in applied sciences, where the goals are often practical and not merely scientific. In this paper, we present a case study concerning earthquake engineering. So far, the philosophical literature has considered various branches of engineering, but very rarely earthquake engineering. We claim that the assessment of seismic hazard models (...) is sensitive to both epistemic and non-epistemic values. In particular, we argue that the selection and evaluation of these models are justified by epistemic values, even if they may be contingently influenced by non-epistemic values. By contrast, the aggregation of different models into an ensemble is justified by non-epistemic values, even if epistemic values may play an instrumental role in the attainment of these non-epistemic values. A careful consideration of the different epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in the choice of seismic hazard models is thus practically important when alternative models are available and there is uncertainty in the scientific community about which model should be used. (shrink)

This book puts forward a new role for mathematics in the natural sciences. In the traditional understanding, a strong viewpoint is advocated, on the one hand, according to which mathematics is used for truthfully expressing laws of nature and thus for rendering the rational structure of the world. In a weaker understanding, many deny that these fundamental laws are of an essentially mathematical character, and suggest that mathematics is merely a convenient tool for systematizing observational knowledge. The position developed in (...) this volume combines features of both the strong and the weak viewpoint. In accordance with the former, mathematics is assigned an active and even shaping role in the sciences, but at the same time, employing mathematics as a tool is taken to be independent from the possible mathematical structure of the objects under consideration. Hence the tool perspective is contextual rather than ontological. Furthermore, tool-use has to respect conditions like suitability, efficacy, optimality, and others. There is a spectrum of means that will normally differ in how well they serve particular purposes. The tool perspective underlines the inevitably provisional validity of mathematics: any tool can be adjusted, improved, or lose its adequacy upon changing practical conditions. (shrink)

This book takes a novel approach by highlighting comparative and long-term historical perspectives on experimental practice. The juxtaposition of accounts of natural, social, and medical experimentation is very enlightening, especially because the authors put the emphasis on the different kinds of objects of experimentation (physical matter, chemical reagents, social groups, organizations, sick individuals, archeological remains) and demonstrate how much the kinds of objects matter for the practice of experimentation, its methods, tools, and methodologies. Taken together, the chapters raise several fascinating (...) questions for further study: What do these different approaches have in common? Why do we call them “experimentation”? What are the intersections among the fields and their developments? The volume engages philosophical approaches that are not well known to Anglophone readers (Bachelard, Bergson, Bernard, Canguilhem, among others) and brings to attention a wealth of Francophone secondary literature on past and present scientific experimentation. The collection fills a yawning gap in science, science studies, and philosophy of science teaching, making it particularly valuable philosophers and historians of science in all subfields. (shrink)

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)